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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the extent of the exogeneity of the money supply using monthly data spanning from 
1964.04 to 1986.02. The tests applied investigated the plausibility of classical hypotheses. We 
employed Kalman Filter procedures, Johansen cointegration procedures, and the bootstrap 
approach. We argued that the real rate of interest did cause, in the Granger sense, the bond stock 
supporting the claim that the monetary authority was able to perform indirect monetary control 
through open market transactions. The results show that seigniorage collection was a white noise 
and econometrically independent from the inflation rate. Money creation and the inflation rate 
were cointegrated. We found that money growth was weakly exogenous for the parameter of 
interest in the conditional model of inflation, but the reverse is not true for inflation. Moreover, 
Granger’s causal relation between them was unidirectional from money to inflation. Therefore, 
money growth was strongly exogenous concerning the inflation rate. These empirical findings 
differ greatly from many previous results. Our main contribution is having demonstrated that the 
monetary supply was exogenous with respect to the inflation rate and that the monetary authority 
had enough independence to execute an active monetary policy. 
 
Key words: Kalman filtering, cointegration procedures, bootstrap, econometric modeling, 
inflation, money supply, monetary policy.  
 
 
RESUMO 
 
Usando dados mensais de 1964.4 a 1986.2, examinamos o grau da exogeneidade da oferta de 
moeda. Os testes implementados investigaram a plausibilidade das hipóteses clássicas. 
Empregamos filtros de Kalman, o procedimento de cointegração de Johansen e a abordagem de 
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bootstrap. Argumentamos que a taxa real de juros causava a dívida pública no sentido de 
Granger, o que suporta a tese de que a autoridade monetária era capaz de realizar indiretamente o 
controle monetário através das operações de mercado aberto. Os resultados mostraram que a 
coleta de senhoriagem se comportava como um ruído branco e era econometricamente 
independente da taxa de inflação. A expansão monetária e a taxa de inflação eram cointegradas. 
Os testes indicaram que a expansão monetária era fracamente exógena para os parâmetros de 
interesse no modelo condicional da inflação, mas o inverso não é válido para a taxa de inflação. 
Ademais, a relação de causalidade de Granger entre essas variáveis era unidirecional, da 
expansão monetária para a inflação. Portanto, o crescimento monetário era fortemente exógeno 
no que concerne à taxa de inflação. Esses resultados são inteiramente divergentes de estudos 
anteriores. Nossa principal contribuição é ter demonstrado que a oferta monetária era exógena 
com respeito à taxa de inflação e que a autoridade monetária tinha independência suficiente para 
executar uma política monetária ativa.  
 
Palavras-chave: filtros de Kalman, cointegração, bootstrap, modelagem econométrica, inflação, 
oferta de moeda, política monetária. 
 
JEL Classification: C32, C52, E31, E51, E52. 
 
1 Introduction  
 
From 1964 to 1985, the policy of inflation stabilization was centered on aggregate 
demand management and wages, exchange rate, public prices and concentrated sector price 
controls. The fact that during these years the economic policy was conducted in a seemingly 
“orthodox way” could induce us to conjecture about the behavior of the monetary policy. Are 
there reasons to support the claim that the money supply was exogenously determined concerning 
the inflation rate, that is, did the monetary authority follow a rule of money creation that did not 
accommodate the movements in the inflation rate? The motivation that guides the present paper 
addresses these issues.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to prove that the monetary supply was exogenously 
determined from 1964.04 to 1986.02. That is, we claim that the monetary policy was active, and 
within Cagan’s (1956) and Sargent and Wallace’s (1973) models, show that the formation rule of 
the inflation expectation followed an adaptive scheme. We thus postulate that the monetary rule 
was executed independently and the rule that guided the monetary execution was exogenous with 
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respect to both the ‘model in question’ and the inflation rate (for a detailed description of the 
monetary policy of the period, see Simonsen, 1985 and Cerqueira, 2007a).  
 
We intend to support this assumption with three arguments. First, the monetary authority 
conducted the open market policy increasing the real interest rate in order to stimulate the 
demand for bonds. Second, even if during part of this period the seigniorage collection remained 
constant as a share of GDP, the government succeeded in keeping its fraction of revenues by 
reducing the monetary base multiplier1. Moreover, the seigniorage-GDP ratio followed a white 
noise process and was therefore independent of the inflation rate. Third, the existing causality 
between money growth and inflation was unidirectional from the former to the latter.  
 
Many Brazilian economists thought the money supply was passive during most of the 
period from 1964.04-1986.02. One likely rationale supporting this belief is the hypothesis of 
rational expectations. If the demand function for real balances follows Cagan’s form, the solution 
for the current inflation is a function of the expected money creation rate, excluding the 
possibility of rational explosive bubbles. In this case, money supply is endogenous.  
 
An alternative argument is based on Sargent and Wallace’s (1973) scheme derived from 
Cagan’s model under the hypotheses of adaptive expectations and a monetary rule, which depend 
on past inflation rates. This is a model in which the adaptive mechanism is rational. In Sargent & 
Wallace’s model, the best way to forecast the subsequent rates of money creation is by 
extrapolating lagged rates of inflation. This in turn implies that inflation itself is best forecast by 
extrapolating past inflation rates. So both money creation and inflation are best forecast by 
extrapolating current and lagged rates of inflation. Lagged rates of money creation add nothing to 
forecasts made in this way. In this model, past values of inflation influence money creation but 
the opposite is not true; thus, money supply is passive.  
 
An essential element in this argument is the hypothesized feedback that occurs from 
expected inflation to money creation. This feedback emerges due to the government’s attempt to 
finance a roughly constant rate of operational deficit by money creation. In this sense, this is also 
a description of Bruno and Fischer’s (1990) version of Cagan’s model, in which monetary 
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expansion is endogenously determined by expected inflation, given a constant level of 
seigniorage. 
However, if monetary expansion follows a purely autoregressive process or a white noise 
process, then under adaptive expectations monetary expansion and money supply are exogenous 
regarding the inflation rate. In this system, money creation influences current and subsequent 
inflation rates; but given lagged rates of money creation, past inflation rates exert no influence on 
money creation. The system is one in which money creation causes inflation, in Granger’s sense, 
whereas inflation does not cause money creation. In this model adaptive expectations are not 
rational, feedback occurs from the expected inflation to the current inflation rate, emerging from 
an autonomous increase in monetary expansion. Therefore, under adaptive expectations the 
money supply passivity is a consequence of the monetary rule followed by the monetary 
authority. 
 
Brazil’s long experience with high inflation rates gave rise to an efficient indexation 
system that protected agents from the effects of inflation. Even if the indexation rules did not 
fairly contemplate the agents, one cannot deny that such rules prevented the ever-rising inflation 
from degenerating into public panic, speculative run and an open hyperinflation process. 
Furthermore, the indexation rules were developed slowly throughout the seventies and eighties 
simultaneously with an increasing inflation rate. Price system inflexibility was then introduced 
gradually, which augmented inflation inertia but did not destroy the inflationary memory. Thus, 
as the economy’s degree of indexation rose, the inflation rate became inertial, i.e., its present 
values began to depend on its past ones. These arguments supposedly explain why the agents had 
adaptive expectations about the inflation in the period. Therefore, Brazil’s experience over the 
period did not provide evidence of expectations being formed rationally. One can therefore argue 
that the monetary policy followed a rule independent of the inflation rate. This assertion is tested 
in section 3. 
 
The assumption of endogenous money growth cannot be supported by empirical evidence. 
Surprisingly, some Brazilian authors found a unidirectional relation between inflation and money 
creation; see the empirical studies of Marques (1983), Triches (1992), Pastore (1994/1995, 1997). 
We can suppose that their results were obtained by using lower frequency data (quarterly). The 
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resulting information loss may have distorted the causality test results. They relied on the Ljung-
Box test and the related correlogram for detecting serial correlation and setting the lag length in 
autoregressive models. It is well known that the portmanteau test may have very low power in the 
detection of specific important departures from the assumed model. It is therefore unwise to rely 
exclusively on this test to check model adequacy. However, it can be valuable when used with 
other tests. The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test is a common complement to the Q-test 
(Granger and Newbold, 1986). By carrying out both tests and using monthly data from 1964.04 
to 1986.022, we achieved results that contrast sharply with earlier findings by other Brazilian 
authors. This might explain why different conclusions emerged when the same causality tests 
were applied. 
 
Why in that period monetary expansion increased uninterruptedly with a behavior close to 
that of an I(1) process remains an unanswered question. We conjecture that the answer may be 
found in the chronic public deficit that was partly financed by issuing bonds. This produced an 
ever-increasing financial component3. If the rule governing the monetary authority was to achieve 
debt sustainability, then it was urgent to support the deficit financing by increasing money 
creation. This led to a pegging of the inflation rate. Thus the monetary authority chose, or was 
compelled to choose, the inflationary deficit finance in order to sustain the debt. There was, then, 
a choice of economic policy. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe in general lines the results 
presented in Cerqueira (2006) on the Brazilian monetary regime and the relation between real 
interest rate and the public debt. In section 3 we present the paper’s theoretical framework, and 
provide a statistical procedure for determining the stochastic process of seigniorage collection. 
Section 4 offers an econometric study about the long-run relationship between money creation 
and inflation rate. And in section 5 we present our conclusions. In appendix A we provide an 
analysis of the integration order of the two series. In appendix B we report the results of the 
cointegration tests. To save space we do not report all relevant tests and diagnoses but one can 
access them in Cerqueira (2007b), working paper 217, in the site 
www.uff.br/econ/publicações/textosdiscussão. 
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2 The Brazilian monetary regime 
 
In Brazil, monetary control did not take place through open market transactions, discount 
loans or reserve requirements. Over here the monetary policy was conducted indirectly, through a 
particular form of open market transactions. Moreover, there was an economy with a consistently 
increasing inflation. 
 
In the Brazilian monetary regime, firstly the Treasury financed itself directly through the 
Central Bank. Secondly, public bonds were not sold to the final takers, but to financial 
institutions instead, which financed themselves through overnight deposits from the private 
sector. At the same time, the Central Bank informally gave liquidity to excess bonds over these 
deposits by means of repurchase agreements. If in a primary auction the financial intermediaries 
did not succeed in getting a permanent and equal increase in their funding, they could then resell 
their holdings of excess bonds to the Central Bank. The repurchase agreements were needed 
because free reserves were costly to the banks. If the banks had to wait for government securities 
to mature and the Central Bank did not provide (inexpensive) liquidity to the system, banks 
would either have had to hold a much larger volume of free reserves (within an inflationary 
environment), or have resorted more often to the discount loans, which would have been 
unbearably costly to them.  
 
The main consequence of this procedure was the elimination of open market operations as 
an instrument of monetary policy. Money supply was controlled indirectly by increasing the 
interest rate to expand the demand for bonds. This procedure was efficient from 1966 to 1985, as 
demonstrated in Cerqueira (2006). The author’s results show that the causality in Granger’s sense 
was unidirectional from the real interest rates to the public debt/GDP ratio from 1974 to 1985. 
Thus, one could assume that the real interest rates were strictly exogenous as to the demand for 
bonds; see Sargent (1987). It can thus be concluded that the monetary authority altered the real 
interest rates to cause changes in the demand for bonds. Besides, since the public debt is a non-
monetary liability, this mechanism operated as an instrument to control the money supply. 
Finally, the demand for bonds was elastic to the real interest rates, and the overnight interest rates 
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were high enough to encourage bond sales. These empirical facts suggest an active behavior of 
the monetary authority instead of a passive monetary policy and an endogenous money supply. 
 
3 Seigniorage and inflation  
 
Let us consider the following continuous time version of Cagan’s model: 
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=≡ , c > 0 and α > 0 (money demand equation),                  (1) 
                                             )( ee pi−piβ=pi
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, β > 0 (expectation rule equation),                           (2) 
where M is nominal money demand, P is index price, Y the GDP, c is a constant which captures 
nominal shocks and financial innovation changes, pie is the expected inflation rate, α is the semi-
elasticity of money demand with regard to the expected inflation, and β is the opposite of 
inflationary memory (the bigger β is, the smaller the effect of past inflation on present inflation 
expectations). We assume a constant growth rate and a constant real interest rate. For a given 
level of exogenous money growth µ, the seigniorage flow is given by:  
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By making some operations we get to the expected inflation rate dynamics equation: 
                                                          )(
b1
b ee pi−µ
α−
=pi&                                                               (4) 
In a steady state epi& =0 and pi=pi=µ e  and the inflation tax equals the seigniorage. The 
seigniorage is maximized (S*=c/αe) when α=pi /1 . With a constant operational deficit at the 
SS =  level, the monetary authority would react according to: 
                                                                       
ece
S
αpi−
=µ                                                                (5) 
 
The monetary expansion rate increases with the expected level of inflation and thus is 
passive. So a reduction in the constant term c caused by a financial innovation shifts down the 
reaction curve that increases the monetary expansion and the inflation rate – in the (pie,µ) 
mapping −, which implies increases in monetary expansion and inflation expectations. 
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The postulation of a reaction curve as (5) and the existence of empirical evidence that the 
monetary authority had been following it are two different things. Such behavior implies a 
passive a money supply caused, in Granger’s sense, by lagged inflation rates, a popular 
hypothesis among Brazilian economists. This claim tends to be accepted due to the empirical 
evidence in Pastore (1994/1995, 1997), whose results show that money growth is caused by 
inflation, but the opposite is not true. Therefore the author concludes that the money supply was 
predominantly passive. 
 
Intuition suggests that the Central Bank’s repurchase agreements tended to make money 
supply endogenous. However, some reflection shows that the former facilitates the latter, though 
does not determine it. If the inflation rates grow due to a negative supply shock and the Central 
Bank’s goal was to keep the real interest rate constant, the Bank would automatically buy bonds 
through repurchase agreements, sanctioning the price increase with a larger monetary base stock. 
The money supply was made endogenous or caused by the Central Bank’s rule to fix the real 
interest rate, and was but was facilitated – or accelerated – by the repurchase agreements, not due 
to the latter per se. Money endogeneity runs independently of the monetary regime provided that 
the Central Bank keeps the real interest rate constant4. 
 
Notwithstanding, if the Central Bank allows the real interest rate’s floating to sell bonds, 
such causality will be eliminated or reduced. In the Brazilian monetary regime, selling bonds 
would cause a simultaneous increase in the nominal and real interest rates, whereas in a 
conventional monetary regime the increase of interest rates would cause a growth of bond 
demand, implying a more instantaneous and precise control of monetary stock than in our case.  
 
Cerqueira (2006) showed that the real interest rates floating not only appeared to be 
significant in the public bonds demand, but also caused the public debt. These empirical results 
contradict Pastore’s evidence, making us review his empirical analysis on the causality between 
the inflation rate and money growth. We shall start by analyzing the behavior of the 
seigniorage/GDP ratio series. In 1976, the monthly inflation rate went above 3% and from 1976.1 
to 1988.4 the monetary base growth as GDP fraction did no present any significant change. We 
thus admit that from this level the inflation acceleration would not have any impact over 
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government revenue with issuance base. Then the primary money growth can be taken as 
relatively constant and independent from the inflation rate. This leads us to presume that 
seigniorage can be described as an erratic process similar to a white noise; see figure 1. This 
hypothesis is based on the increasing cost of holding money and on the process of fiat money 
replacement by other financial assets, which took place after 1976. 
 
The seigniorage/GDP series has a quarterly frequency, as does the GDP. The real GDP is 
the one estimated in Cerqueira (2007c), by Kalman filter with benchmarking adjustment; see 
Durbin and Koopman (2004). Since the seigniorage/GDP shows seasonality and some outliers, 
we decided to extract these components first. We estimated a stationary structural model using 
Kalman filter procedures with an AR(1) component, fixed seasonal dummies, intervention 
variables such as impulse dummies – 1986.2, 1986.3 and 1987.1 – and an irregular term. As 
required, the smoothed disturbances model are approximately N(0,σ2)5.  
 
The statistical approach thus proceeds using independence tests on the adjusted series. We 
first performed unit root tests. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, without break 
dummies, and their modifications for the series level largely reject (with p-values near zero) the 
null hypothesis of a unit root; see Cerqueira (2007b) for further details. In the next step we study 
the autocorrelation functions, spectrum, cumulative periodogram, CUSUMSQ, histogram and 
QQ of the Seigniorage/GDP series. Ljung-Box test statistics accept the hypothesis that there is no 
autocorrelation up to order 12 and 24 with p-values 0.9883 and 0.2698, respectively. Spectral 
density is close to that of a stationary series similar to a white noise like the frequency response 
function computed with bandpass filtered series with Christiano-Fitzgerald’s method. The 
cumulative periodogram behaves likewise, and the associated Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics 
accept the null hypothesis that the series is close to a white noise at 5%. Evidence shows that the 
money growth series over GDP is an ergodic process close to a strong white noise6. 
 
The normality tests statistics of Bera-Jarque and Hansen-Doornik have p-values equal to 
0.766 and 0.776, respectively, which suggests that the series is a Gaussian white noise. Assuming 
that the above results are correct, Seigniorage/GDP (SY) regression against a constant and the 
inflation rate (PI) must reach the following results: (i) constant significant at the level of the 
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sample mean (0.017); (ii) non-significant inflation rate coefficient; (iii) R2 close to zero; (iv) 
residuals approximately NIID. These results are evidenced in table 1. With p-value 0.9879, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the equation’s constant term approximately equals the series’ 
sample mean. Nor can we reject the hypothesis that the inflation rate coefficient is non-
significant; and that both R2 and residuals behave according to expectations. 
 
Table 1: OLS Regression SY against PI. 
 
Variable Coefficients P-value 
C 0.0170 0.0000 
PI -0.0002 0.9852 
N=52 R2=0.000001 F=0.0004 SER=0.0052 DW=1.7914* Q(12)=0.9883 
Q(24)=0.2362 LM(4)=0.8284 WHITE=0.1230 ARCH(1)=0.7382   
* The hypothesis test in which DW = 2 is taken with p-value = 0.4520. 
 
The above results confirm the hypothesis that from 1976.1 to 1988.4 the ratio 
seigniorage/GDP followed a white noise statistic process ~ (0.0170; 0.0052). This means that, 
even having a finite average, its behavior could not be predicted due to the series’ lack of 
memory. Thus, seigniorage collection behaved as a random shock. It did not show any relation 
with the contraction of money holdings or with the rise of the inflation rate. It can, therefore, be 
taken as independent from the inflation rate, which did not alter in any way this government-
financing source. Such conclusion provides empirical support to the hypothesis that even if the 
monetary authority was attempting to finance a roughly constant rate of public deficit by money 
creation, the seigniorage collection did not follow a path consistent with the endogenous money 
supply. 
 
We claim this is likely to be related to the policy of reducing the base multiplier. This 
policy contributed to maintain the effectiveness of inflationary tax collection, reinforcing the 
claim of an exogenous monetary policy. In such a case, money supply issuing influences current 
and future inflation rates, but past inflation values do not influence money supply7. The system is 
such that money creation causes inflation, though not the other way round. In this system, 
Cagan’s adaptive scheme is not rational. 
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From 1976 to 1985 a host of financial innovations contracted the monetary demand that 
restricted seigniorage collection. However, the policy to reduce the monetary base multiplier 
counterbalanced this effect (Figure 1)8. Moreover, the observed inflation and monetary rates, 
while increasing, were very distant from the unstable levels, thus far from a hyperinflationary 
disequilibrium; see Cerqueira (2006). We thus assert that a fixed rate of public deficit 
permanently funded by money creation supported the sustainability of the public debt, as the 
exogeneity of money supply was preserved. This suggests the existence of a steady state public 
deficit financed by seigniorage, as in Cagan’s adaptative model; see details in Cerqueira (2007b). 
To complete the exogeneity hypothesis’ money supply proof, it must be shown that money 
growth in Granger’s sense caused the inflation rate, but inflation did not cause money growth 
(see Sargent and Wallace, 1993).  
 
Figure 1: Base Multiplier. 
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4 Money supply exogeneity  
 
The study comprises the 1964.04-1986.02 period. The former marks the end of a period of 
monetary imbalance and the beginning of a vigorous and successful plan to stabilize inflation, 
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based on harsh fiscal and monetary policies. The period truncation is for 1986.02 due to a radical 
change in the inflation stabilization policy – which took place in 1986.03 – which brought about 
wage and price freezing and an accommodative monetary policy. The implication was 
acceleration and permanent change in inflation dynamics, which supposedly changed the rules of 
inflation expectation formation. Thus, we underline that the results in this paper refer only to the 
period between 1964.04 and 1986.02. 
 
When looking for a causal relation, the first step is determining the series series’ 
integration order, and then testing the existence of a cointegration relation between them. If so, it 
is tested whether any of the variables can be regarded as weakly exogenous with a given interest 
parameter. Ultimately, causality tests in Granger’s sense are carried out. As the series present 
many outliers and their presence makes it difficult to implement cointegration tests (see 
Cerqueira, 2006), we chose to have the series go through the previous treatment by using 
univariate structural models with Kalman filtering procedures. We also decided to seasonally 
adjust the series by putting aside the respective stochastic seasonal component identified by the 
same approach. Both procedures imply causing the VAR to be parsimonious, especially when 
working with monthly data. The adjusted (ADJ) and observed (OBS) series are shown in Figure 2 
in monthly frequency. Unit root tests are reported in Appendix A. Inflation series show no 
ambiguities I(1), the money supply series is also taken as I(1).  
 
The next step is finding a cointegration relation between the variables. We chose 
Johansen’s (1991) co-integration procedure test. Choosing the VAR lag length and the 
deterministic components is crucial for the test results. We decided to specify the VAR according 
to the recommendation by Gonzalo (1994), Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996), Giles & Mirza (1998) 
and Lütkepohl and Saikkonen (1999). Thus we searched for a stable VAR – which led to the 
introduction of a linear trend term – whose residuals assessed by multivariate portmanteau (with 
minimal lag adjusted by the degrees of freedom and T/4) and Breusch-Godfrey type tests (1 to 12 
lags) did not carry any serial correlation. This made us reach 10 as the minimal lag number. On 
the other hand, an overfitting model has little efficiency loss, whereas consistency is lost if the 
lag length is too small. Wald test’s power loss is small when extra lags are added, in case the true 
VAR order is large and the system dimension small. Moreover, when unidirectional causality is 
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suspected, overfitting methods cause less distortion with often little or no power loss if compared 
to the pre-testing procedures; see Giles and Mirza (1998). For those reasons, we chose to work 
with an overfitted VAR(11). 
 
Figure 2: Rate of Inflation (PI) and Money Growth (MU) Observed and Adjusted (with Kalman 
Filter). 
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Although the series are treated as outliers, analysis of the unrestricted VAR residuals – 
without imposition of cointegration relation – suggests the presence of ARCH elements and non-
Gaussian residuals9. The causes for such violations derive fundamentally from the inflation rate. 
These are not a blow for the cointegration relation since asymptotic properties of Johansen’s 
procedure exclusively depend on IID error hypothesis. So the normality hypothesis is thus not 
vital for conclusions – although the ARCH effect might be; see Johansen (1995).  
 
We therefore rejected the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration at 1% significance 
level according to the trace statistics and at 1.8% with the maximum eigenvalue statistics10. The 
cointegration test results are displayed in table B1. Cointegration corroborates the hypothetical 
absence of no rational bubbles from 1964.04 to 1986.02. This implies excluding the hypothesis 
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that inflation acceleration in the late-1985 to early-1986 period was causing speculative 
hyperinflation. Testing for the plausibility of the (1,-1,#,#) cointegrating vector confirmed a 
homogeneous long-run relation between money growth and inflation. This is the classical 
representation in which the long-run relationship between inflation and money growth has 
cointegrating vector β=(1,-1) and a moving stationary drift term. This could be represented by the 
real interest rate, which is an I(0) series. 
 
Table B2 shows the results of two weak-exogeneity tests conditioned by the existence of 
one cointegrating vector: the first uses a theoretical vector (1,-1,#,#); the second the estimated 
vector shown in table B1. At usual significance levels, we found that money creation is weakly 
exogenous for the parameters of interest in the conditional model of inflation. However, the 
opposite is not true for inflation. Such results corroborate the idea implicit in equation (4). 
Monetary shock causes expected inflation to accelerate, which in turn increases inflation. The 
inflation rate drifts above its steady state. Once the adjustment coefficient is negative11, 
expectation increase is reduced, thereby forcing the inflation rate down towards the long-run 
path.  
Table 2: Granger Causality Tests (P-Values)a . 
 
Non-Gaussian Residuals b Monte Carlo Tests c Null 
Hypothesis MI PI MI PI 
  
  
PI⇒/ MI 
F 
LR 
 
0.5785 
0.5097 
 
 
0.5749 
0.5749 
 
   
0.0161 
0.0161 
   
MI⇒/ PI 
F 
LR 
 
 
0.0014 
0.0076 
  
(a) The symbol ⇒/ means “does not cause in Granger’s sense”. (b) Strong exogeneity: PI ⇒/  MI {F=0.6568; 
LR=0.5916}, MI ⇒/ PI {F=0.0003; LR=0.0001}. (c) Monte Carlo p-values for the strong exogeneity tests: PI ⇒/  MI 
{F=0.6510; LR=0.6510}, MI ⇒/  PI {F=0.0002; LR=0.0002}. MI represents money growth and PI inflation rate. 
 
 
Inspection of residuals after imposing all the above restrictions enhances the residual 
stochastic properties, closer to being Gaussian. As in the non-restricted model (not reported), 
some hypothesis violations can be traced to the residuals of the inflation equation. There are also 
four roots in the companion matrix around 0.90. This shows that system stability is far from 
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ideal, although it is not explosive. On the other hand, the multivariate diagnostic tests show that 
our choice of 11 lags for the VAR was appropriate. Firstly because the residuals have no serial 
correlation, and secondly because choosing a more parsimonious VAR would have led to the 
estimation of misspecified VECM model with autocorrelated residuals (these results are not 
reported in the paper, see Cerqueira, 2007b). 
 
Figure 3: Response to Generalized one S.D. Innovations. 
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Two non-causality tests are shown in table 2 together with the strong exogeneity tests12. 
Granger’s direct test specification is taken from the VECM estimates – with 11 lags − and the 
restriction given by (1,-1,#,#). Residuals of the money creation equation are approximately NIID, 
whereas residuals of the inflation equation are not. We thus used a parametrical bootstrap13 to 
access the specific distribution of Wald (F) and likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics. As one can 
observe, the conclusions hold. Causality test results show that money growth causes inflation, 
whereas the inflation rate fails to cause money growth. There is no type of feedback from 
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inflation to currency. This result contrasts with Cerqueira (2006). This is illustrated by the 
impulse-response functions14 (Figure 3) estimated with generalized impulse. This procedure 
constructs an orthogonal set of innovations that does not depend on the VAR ordering15; see 
Pesaran and Shin (1998). 
 
The one standard shock in money growth causes a period of fluctuations in this series 
until it achieves its new steady state level, around 0.56 percentage points (hypothesis accepted 
with p-value = 0.8379) above its initial level. Indeed, beyond period 27, the impulse functions are 
statistically different from zero, with p-value around 0%, which backs this claim. The impulse in 
monetary expansion leads to a permanent increase in the inflation rate, but an inflationary shock 
does not have any meaningful effect on money growth. The peak shown in the seventh period is 
not significant with p-value 0.8544, and the average impact is close to zero throughout the period. 
 
On the other hand, a monetary shock has permanent impact on the inflation rate, close to 
0.55 percentage points. When innovations are considered, either in inflation rate or in money 
growth, 84% of the final variation in inflation rate is caused by monetary shock. This result – 
attained with the inflation rate prediction error variance decomposition – shows a feedback effect 
(around 16%) on the inflation rate due to inflationary expectations. We can conclude that the 
existing persistence in inflation was mainly due to monetary causes, not disturbances on the real 
side of the economy or to the price indexation system. As for the inflation rate from 1964.04 to 
1986.02, there is enough evidence to validate the hypothesis that money growth is strongly 
exogenous. Evidence supports the claim that causality is unidirectional and moves from money 
expansion to inflation16. This means that money supply was not passive and was strictly 
econometrically exogenous (Sims, 1972) with respect to determining prices17. Besides, this 
strongly indicates that the monetary authority did not, in the period, follow as a monetary rule a 
reaction curve as the one described in equation (5)18. Lastly, once the money supply was 
exogenous, Sargent and Wallace’s (1973) model reveals that the inflation expectation from 
1964.04 to 1986.02 followed Cagan’s adaptive scheme.  
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5 Conclusions  
 
This paper presents tests on the exogeneity of the Brazilian monetary supply for the 
military period spanning from 1964.01 to 1986.02 using monthly data. We chose this period 
because the macroeconomic policy was more homogenous regarding the inflation stabilization 
policy than that of more recent years.  The results show that even if there was a nearly stable 
average seigniorage between 1976.1 and 1988.4, this did not lead to endogeneity of the money 
supply, since money growth was strongly exogenous with respect to the inflation rate. Results 
show that the monetary expansion caused the inflation rate in Granger’s sense, and the former 
was weakly exogenous compared with the latter. This was possible because the monetary 
authority chose to reduce the base multiplier in order to keep its proportion of seigniorage 
collection. Therefore, even with (i) a permanent deficit with the seigniorage playing a crucial role 
in balancing the public accounts, and (ii) a host of financial innovations that led to the contraction 
of the money demand, the money supply remained exogenous with respect to the inflation rate. 
Therefore, Brazilian inflation followed an ever-increasing path without setting off a 
hyperinflationary process.  
 
We may conclude that money creation influences current and future inflation rates, but, 
given lagged rates of money creation, past inflation rates exert no influence on money creation. 
This is an indication that Cagan’s rational adaptive schemes are not adequate for the Brazilian 
economy and that the rule followed by economic agents to form expectations about inflation was 
adaptive. That is a normative conclusion from the Sargent-Wallace (1973) paper based on 
Cagan’s. This contrasts sharply with an existing tradition among Brazilian economists, who 
assume that the monetary policy was completely passive during the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Indeed, our results reveal that the monetary policy was executed in an independent way, 
that is, the rule guiding monetary execution was taken exogenously with regard to the considered 
model and the inflation rate. Therefore, we postulate that the monetary authority chose to finance 
a roughly fixed rate of public deficit by issuing money. This explains the intermittent monetary 
expansion and the inflation rate. Such policy generated a vicious cycle: by exacerbating the 
inflation expectations, it introduced a feedback in the inflation growth. In addition, it caused the 
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uninterrupted growth of the debt-service payments and, consequently, the continuous increase of 
the nominal public deficit.  
 
Rejecting the causality from prices to money does not mean to propose there was a rigid 
monetary control. This depends on the monetary regime. In a regime whose monetary authority is 
independent, it is possible to fulfill almost any target of money stock. Compelled by public 
deficit, the monetary authority may refuse to buy public bonds in the open market and then 
impose upon the fiscal authority the cost of increasing the real interest rate through the primary 
auctions. In the Brazilian regime, this was a task for the Central Bank. It was enough that the real 
interest rate was restricted to float within a given range to determine the deficit monetization 
through repurchase agreements. In this regime, monetary control was indirect, and the 
instruments were less efficient but enough to manage an exogenous money supply from inflation 
variations. Perhaps these are somewhat old monetarist ideas, but we cannot deny they stamped 
their mark on the data. For further studies we suggest to apply the approach presented in the 
paper, that is it, the blend of Kalman Filter, Johansen’s cointegration type-test, and the bootstrap 
approach.   
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APPENDIX A 
 Integration order of the inflation rate (PI) and money growth (MI) 
Table 1a reports the results of unit root tests to the series in levels and in first difference 
with monthly frequency. Besides the traditional ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) and PP 
(Phillips-Perron) tests we also report their well-known modifications, namely: DF-GLS (Dickey-
Fuller test with GLS Detrending), ERS-PO (Elliot et al., 2004 point optimal test) and Ng-Perron 
(NG and Perron test); see Maddala and Kim (2002).  
 
 
Table 1a: Unit Root Tests19. 
 
Test Ng-Perron 
Series 
ADF DF-GLS PP ERS-PO 
dMZα  
d
TMZ  
dMSB  dTMP  
PI -0.3250 
(0.9175) 
-0.6547 -1.3833 
(0.5905) 
5.4947 -5.9332† -1.2513 0.2109‡ 5.4723 
∆PI -17.3389* 
(0.0000) 
-13.5691* -20.7605* 
(0.0000) 
1.1901* -29.8104* -3.7964* 0.1274* 1.0253* 
MI 0.3954 
(0.9825) 
0.8579 -8.3199* 
(0.0000) 
0.5988* -117.137* -7.4376* 0.0064* 0.5846* 
∆MI -6.1662* 
(0.0000) 
-0.3041 -58.8791* 
(0.0001) 
7.0571 -4.0041 -1.2602 0.3147 6.2954 
Note: (†) represents rejection of a unit root at the 10% significance level; (‡) at 5% significance; (*) rejection at 1%; 
no symbol means acceptation of the null hypothesis at 10%.  
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Cointegration test 
Table 1b shows the cointegration tests with critical values at 1% level and the respective 
p-values; see Mackinnon et al. (1999). 
 
Table 1b: Johansen cointegration test.  
 
                      TEST  STATISTICS                                                                             COINTEGRATING  VECTOR   
                              (P-VALUES) 
 
             Trace                         λ-Max                                                                       (MONEY, INFLATION, TREND, CONSTANT) 
 
        r=0            r≤1               r=0             r≤1 
    35.8742     13.5674       22.3039      13.5673                                                           (1.0000, -0.9645, -0.0002, 0.0903) 
    (31.1539)   (16.5539)    (23.9753)   (16.5539) 
    (0.0020)     (0.0333)      (0.0183)     (0.0333) 
 
COINTEGRATION RESTRICTION TEST   
RESTRICTION: (1,-1,#,#) χ2(1) = 0.0459; P-VALUE = 0.8309 
Note: The symbol # means the parameter is unrestricted. The estimated eigenvalues are 0.0813 and 0.0503. 
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In Table 2b, we present the weak-exogeneity test using two different statistics. The first 
tests the joint hypothesis that the cointegrating vector is (1,-1,#,#) and the adjustment coefficients 
are respectively (0,α) and (α,0). The second, in brackets, uses the estimated cointegrated vector 
reported in Table B1 and these two adjustment coefficients.  
 
 
Table 2b: Adjustment-coefficient weak exogeneity test. 
 
                      NULL HYPOTHESIS                                                   TEST STATISTIC                                P-
VALUE 
MI is weakly exogenous for the parameter of interest                      0.0823                                        0.9597 
of the PI conditional model                                                              (0.0265)                                      (0. 8707) 
PI is weakly exogenous for the parameter of interest                       8.8580                                        0.0119 
of the MI conditional  model                                                          (8.7229)                                      (0.0031) 
Note: Monte Carlo p-values H0: MI is weakly exogenous to PI {F=0.9090; LR=0.9090} and H0: PI is weakly 
exogenous to MI {F=0.0003; LR=0.0003}. 
                                                 
1
 Since M1=kB, where B is the monetary base and k the multiplier, the inflation tax-GDP ratio is given by 
IT= )K/1)(PY/1M()PY/B( pi=pi , where P is the price index and pi the inflation rate. This means that the government collects 1/k 
of the produced inflation tax by the real money balances. The difference (1-1/k) represents the inflationary transfer from the 
private sector to the bank system. 
2
 Since the pioneer paper of Working (1960), it has been a well-known fact that temporal aggregation has statistical implications 
on the time series properties.  
3
 We estimate that between 1966 and 1985 the proportion of the public deficit due to nominal debt-service increased from 19.7% 
to 77.1%, while the real service decreased from 3.5% to 3.1%. At the same time, the nominal deficit as a GDP fraction rose 
from 4.9% to 20.0%, and the operational deficit from 2.1% to 3.4%. 
4
 It is worth mentioning that during this period Brazil was a closed economy with trade transactions of around US$20 billion per 
year. With great current account deficits that were covered by capital inflow – direct investments and/or long-run borrowings. 
In such a way, Brazilian foreign reserves throughout these years achieved small levels – they floated around US$5 billion – 
and, therefore, they never constituted an important source of monetary base expansion. And in the case of an extraordinary 
entrance of capital it was integrally sterilized. 
5
 The estimates and tests were computed in OxStamp, if the procedure is Kalman filter, or in Eviews or Cats in Rats, if we are 
performing cointegration analysis. 
6
 Indeed, considering Goldfeld-Quandt, LM ARCH and McLeod-Li tests one cannot reject the hypotheses that the series has 
constant non-conditional variance and does not have autoregressive conditional variance throughout the period; see Cerqueira 
(2007b) for details. 
7
 By money growth rate we mean the percent variation of the M1 monetary aggregate; by inflation rate we mean the percent 
variation of IGP-DI of FGV, the Brazilian general price index. 
8
 Whereas the reduction in the money demand’s constant term implied the decrease of the required money stock by 43.9166%, 
from 1975 to 1984/85, the money multiplier dropped by 39.3997%, which represented an increase of 65.0160% in the rate of 
inflation tax collected on the M1 stock. This more than compensated for the first effect; see Cerqueira (2006). 
9
 These results are not reported in the paper. 
10
 These results must be taken cautiously, since one of the series – money growth – has a long memory and is not a pure I(1) 
process. As discussed in the appendix, it is hard to differentiate the series from a I(1) process with unit root tests. Another 
situation is when the I(1) variable VAR representation has a near singular covariance matrix, in which case Johansen’s LR test 
tends to find spurious cointegration with probability asymptotically equaling 1. The Engle-Granger test is more robust to avoid 
deceitful results, it is recommended to use both tests; see Gonzalo and Lee (1995) and Maddala and Kim (2002). We carried out 
the Engle-Granger test with constant and trend – with residuals of the second step not showing serial correlation − and 
concluded that at 5% we reject the hypothesis of zero cointegration between inflation rate and money growth. Thus we can 
continue our analysis with certain relief. 
11
 The value of α was found to be -0.2054. 
12
 Strong exogeneity is the joint hypothesis of weak exogeneity and Granger’s noncausality. 
13
 Because VECM residuals are orthogonal, the error terms could be extracted from a normal distribution with diagonal 
covariance matrix. 
14
 As in Lütkepohl and Reimers (1992), the impulse-response functions were calculated using (1,-1,#.#0) as the cointegrating 
vector and the adjustment factor in the form (-0.2054,0). 
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15
 Actually, the variable order is, in our context, irrelevant, since the correlation coefficient between restrict VECM residuals is -
0.0106, which is approximately zero with p-value 0.6533 (Pearson’s test), and the hypothesis that the inner product (0.0005) is 
zero is accepted with p-value = 0.8794 (by using conventional t test). 
16
 By means of recursive estimation we investigate our model’s parameter constancy. Reason shows that the estimated model has 
acceptable constancy properties which are evidence that money growth is super exogenous with respect to the parameter of 
interest. To save space, the tests carried out are not reported; see Cerqueira (2007b) for further details. 
17
 Using the same series and extending the period to 1960.01 the results change, despite the presence of cointegration relation and 
the accepted homogeneity hypothesis. The hypothesis of weak exogeneity in any of the equations is not possible, and 
noncausality is rejected in both directions, which means that the inflation rate and money growth are both endogenous, which is 
a similar result to Pastore’s (1997). However, such result is not a surprise, since the period prior to 1964.04 is marked by a 
complete lack of monetary control, with public deficits being financed basically by money issuing. In this period, inflation tax 
collection was essential for maintaining public expenditures. This imbalance turned out to modify the relation between money 
growth and inflation.  
18
 This conclusion contradicts Marques (1983), Triches (1992), Pastore (1994/1995), and especially Pastore (1997). We conjecture 
that differences in methodologies and data frequency can explain the divergence between our results and the so-called 
“common wisdom” among Brazilian economists. 
19
 Tests of inflation rate level were specified with 2 lags; for its first difference 1 lag; and of monetary growth, respectively, 11 
and 10 lags. To estimate zero frequency spectra we chose quadratic spectral kernel. Computed p-values in brackets were also 
reported to ADF and PP tests statistics. 
